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Abstract Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke’s argument (Kripke 
1982), analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is 
characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and 
its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who 
do not agree with Kripke’s view have directly contrasted his understanding 
of Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein’s own perspective (LW) in or  after 
Philosophical Investigations (PI). However, I believe that those who have 
closely read both PI and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language with­
out any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is gen­
erally accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to 
present one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW 
deviates from LW in some respects remains unavoidable.
In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the underpinnings of this  impression 
by formulating the paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke and 
 revealing the complicated relation between the two forms of semantic par­
adoxes. I will then not only propose a new interpretation of the argument 
about meaning contained in PI but also suggest a schema or condition for 
semantics that I think holds by itself, independent from exegetical matters.
Keyword: Semantics, Skepticism, Rule­following Consideration, Later Witt­
gen stein, Kripke
1. Introduction
Two lines of criticism of Kripke can be used to argue against his in-
terpretation of LW.1 The first is based on PI §201. KW thinks that the 
skeptical paradox about meaning constitutes the central problem of 
PI,2 and he accepts this as a valid conclusion.3 On the other hand, in 
the second paragraph of §201, LW rejects the skeptical paradox as a 
1  This paper is a greatly extended and revised version of another paper ((2012), “On 
Semantic Skepticism: Wittgenstein’s Paradox of Rule Following and Kripke’s Seman-
tic Paradox,” in Proceedings of the 35th International Wittgenstein Symposium XX, 
309–312). This work was supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific-Research (C) 
Grant Number 26370017.
2  cf. Kripke, ibid, 7.
3  “Wittgenstein holds, with the sceptic, that there is no fact as … or quus.” (Kripke, 
ibid, 70–1)
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 misunderstanding.4 Therefore, if KW’s semantic paradox were essen-
tially identical to LW’s paradox of rule following, these thinkers would 
disagree with each other regarding the paradox.
However, notwithstanding his own insistence, KW’s semantic paradox 
is fundamentally different from LW’s paradox of rule following. If this 
view were correct, LW’s denial of the latter paradox, based on the afore-
mentioned misunderstanding, would not entail his rejection of the for-
mer. In this case, criticism of Kripke’s interpretation based on PI §201 
must be seen as missing the point. I illuminate the difference between 
the two paradoxes by extracting the structure of LW’s paradox of rule 
following in the next section. 
The second line of argument for opposing KW against LW concerns 
KW’s skeptical solution to the skeptical paradox. As many scholars have 
pointed out,5 if the skeptical solution were inconsistent with LW’s view 
of meaning and if the skeptical solution were integrated into KW’s 
skeptical paradox as a theory of meaning, then it would follow that LW 
should not accept KW’s skeptical paradox as valid. Indeed, I think that 
the skeptical solution is invalid both as an interpretation of LW and 
as an independent argument that attempts to solve the skeptical para-
dox. I believe that KW diverges from LW most dramatically with regard 
to the skeptical solution. However, according to my view, KW’s skepti-
cal paradox is separable from the skeptical solution. It seems possible 
to provide another skeptical solution while maintaining the skeptical 
paradox as a valid argument. I believe that another skeptical solution is 
at least compatible with LW’s view about meaning, even if LW did not 
propose it explicitly. In section 3, I will formulate KW’s semantic para-
dox and examine LW’s possible response to it. I will then show that we 
cannot help but confront an aporia regarding the interpretation of LW. 
In section 4, I will show that this aporia can be avoided by a new skep-
tical solution.
2. Formulation of Wittgenstein’s paradox  
of rule following
I will quote the first two paragraphs of PI §201 for the purpose of formu-
lating Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule following (WP).
4  cf. Baker & Hacker 1984, Malcom 1986, McDowell 1984, McGinn 1984.
5  cf. Wright 2001, Ch. 4, Harrison 1991. 
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This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a 
rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with 
the rule. The answer was that if everything can be made out to ac-
cord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. 
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere 
fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation 
after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, un-
til we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is 
that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, 
but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going 
against it” in actual cases.
Wittgenstein’s paradox (WP) is presented in the first paragraph. In the 
second paragraph, LW describes how to dissolve it by pointing out a 
misunderstanding in WP, namely “we give one interpretation after an-
other” when we follow a rule. In other words, he insists that WP arises 
from the thought that “every act of grasping a rule is interpretation.” 
Thus, if the thought that “every act of grasping a rule is interpretation” 
were negated, WP could be dissolved as a disguised paradox. Of course, 
some room exists for the interpretation of §201. However, in the context 
of the aforementioned points and of the descriptions in PI that precede 
§201, WP and the dissolution thereof can be formulated as follows:
[WP]
Premise 1: Every act of grasping a rule is interpretation.
Premise 2: [Fact-A] Whether a rule might be expressed as a picture 
or an illustrated formula or sign (literal or phonetic) and whether it 
might occur in one’s mind or stand explicitly outside of the mind, it 
is always possible for us to interpret an application that differs from 
the one that naturally strikes us. (cf. PI §86, 139–141, 146, 185)
Thus, an application that strikes me as natural on the occasion on which 
I am going to apply the rule is equally valid as an interpretation of the 
rule as are other applications that are logically consistent with past ap-
plications. For example, “1002, 1004, 1006, …” may initially be thought 
to be a correct interpretation about applying the rule “+2” after 1000. 
However, this is only one of many possible interpretations of this rule; 
other possibilities, such as “1004, 1008, 1012, …”, also exist. Even if I ap-
peal to “a rule for interpreting a rule” to justify the former interpreta-
tion, the meta-rule itself can be interpreted in various ways. Thus, the 
process by which presentation of a rule opens possible interpretations 
of it will continue without end. Therefore, like Buridan’s ass, I cannot 
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help but keep confronting possible alternatives without being able to 
select any one. 
Conclusion: A rule cannot determine any course of action.
This conclusion is said to express the paradoxical situation that arises 
in advance of applying a rule in that we cannot select a particular way 
to apply it in a new circumstance. The question of PI §198 clearly dem-
onstrates this feature of WP: “But how can a rule shew me what I have 
to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord 
with the rule.” 
However, a fallacy is evident in this inference because in the daily praxis 
of language, “when I obey a rule, I do not choose,” “I obey the rule blind-
ly” (PI §219), and thus a rule can determine a course of action. This out-
right fact contradicts the conclusion of WP. To avoid this conclusion, 
one of the premises must be denied. Premise 2 is the thesis that LW 
draws from his preceding consideration of rule following (PI §86, §139, 
etc.). Thus, premise 1 is supposed to be negated. It follows from it that 
grasping a rule is not an interpretation. “A way of grasping a rule which 
is not interpretation” can be said to be exhibited in our applying rules 
or in our reference from a meta-level perspective to “obeying the rule” 
or “going against it” in circumstances involving the praxis of language. 
Once WP is formulated in this way, it is not indispensable to show-
ing the essential difference between WP and Kripke’s semantic paradox 
(KP) to formulate KP and compare it with WP. Indeed, it can be eas-
ily shown that WP can be dissolved within the schema of KP; in other 
words, WP can be dissolved within the substantive efficacy of KP. Kripke 
evidently admits that an individual who is separated from a communi-
ty and who therefore cannot be provided even with a skeptical solution 
can apply a rule to new examples without hesitation. 
[N]o one actually hesitates when asked to produce an answer to an 
addition problem! Almost all of us unhesitatingly produce the an-
swer “125” when asked for the sum of 68 and 57, without any thought 
to the theoretical possibility that a quus-like rule might have been 
appropriate!6
A circumstance in which everyone unhesitatingly applies the rule to a 
new example contradicts the conclusion of WP (that no one can se-
lect one among multiple alternatives when attempting to apply a rule in 
6  Kripke, ibid, 87.
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a new situation). Thus, following the same inference described above, 
KW is also supposed to attain “a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation.” One must be attentive to the fact that the individual 
discussed here, who is isolated from a community, remains under the 
influence of KP. Indeed, those individuals who are thought to be iso-
lated from a community are not admitted even of a skeptical solution. 
Therefore, I can conclude that KP is fundamentally different from WP. 
Of course, it does not follow from the fundamental difference between 
KP and WP that LW is supposed to consider KP valid while rejecting 
WP as a disguised paradox. It is conceivable that PI as a whole is incom-
patible with KP, even if LW does not directly argue KP. 
3. Kripke’s semantic paradox
3-1. Formulation of Kp
Let me formulate KP for the purpose of examining the relationship be-
tween LW and KP.
[KP]
Premise 1: No facts about meaning exist. 
Premise 2: A semantic statement is true if and only if a fact about 
meaning exists.7
Conclusion: Every sentence has no meaning. 
Because KW does not formulate KP in this way, I will offer a few explan-
atory remarks. Needless to say, premise 1 is nothing but the conclusion 
that KW draws in Part II of the book. To be precise, it is expressed in this 
way: “There is no fact about me that distinguishes between my mean-
ing plus and my meaning quus” and “there is no fact about me that dis-
tinguishes between my meaning a definite function … and my meaning 
nothing at all.”8 Premise 2 was not referenced explicitly when KW exam-
ined the counterargument to draw premise 1. It is not until the skepti-
cal solution is proposed that the existence of premise 2 is revealed. The 
conclusion is drawn based on the following inference:9
1) For any S, p:〚“S” means that p〛is false.
7  According to Kripke, a picture of language based on truth conditions lies behind 
this conditional. cf. Kripke, ibid, 74.
8  Kripke, ibid, 21. 
9  The inference is basically based on Boghossian (Boghossian 1989: 523).
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This is the case because although a semantic statement〚“S” means that 
p〛is true iff a fact about meaning exists (premise 2), no such fact exists 
(premise 1). Then, the disquotational properties of the truth predicate 
guarantee that (1) entails the following: 
2) For any S: S has no meaning.
However, because (2) is supposed to apply to any sentence, a self-re-
futing consequence follows: the argument that draws (2) has no mean-
ing. No other option but to deny premise 2 exists if one is to avoid this 
paradoxical consequence because KW has accepted premise 1 as valid. 
Thus, by converting an understanding of language based on truth con-
ditions to one based on assertibility conditions, KW makes it possible 
to distinguish “following a rule” from “thinking one is following a rule” 
by resorting to the mutual confirmation of community members. As a 
consequence, the condition under which semantic statements can be 
considered as true is barely secured under the skeptical constraint that 
all statements cannot be infallible.
3-2. Kw’s deviance from Lw
How is LW supposed to respond to KP when the latter is formulated in 
this way? As indicated in section 1, despite defenses of Kripke’s interpre-
tation, I cannot help but conclude with many scholars that LW would 
reject such a skeptical solution as that proposed by KW. First among 
the most potent grounds for criticizing KW is that in PI §243, a solitary 
language (individual language),10 which stands in contrast to a private 
language that cannot be understood by anyone except the individual 
who uses it, is explicitly admitted to be possible. Second, the insistence 
corresponding to the communitarian theory of KW that “human agree-
ment decides what is true and what is false” is definitely denied in PI 
§241. Third, the skeptical solution is thought to have its own deficien-
cy11 as an independent argument that attempts to avoid the paradoxical 
conclusion of KP. If the criticism of the skeptical solution were valid, 
we would be compelled to believe that LW advocates such a defective 
argument when the skeptical solution is attributed to LW. The third 
10  For example, Goldfarb (Goldfarb 1985: 475) and McGinn (McGinn 1984: 79) 
make it clear that the solitary language that KW thinks is impossible is essentially 
different from the private language whose impossibility LW attempts to prove.
11  Blackburn (Blackburn 1984), Goldfarb (Goldfarb, ibid), and Boghossian (Bog-
hossian, ibid) are examples of criticisms about the skeptical solution that are framed 
not in terms of the interpretation of LW but in terms of an independent argument. 
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criticism, which has great significance for the following argument, can 
be summarized as follows. 
If the skeptical solution worked effectively, then each member of a com-
munity could confirm whether other members’ usage of a certain sign 
agreed with her own. If this were possible, then she would have to be 
able to compare her own present usage of a certain sign with her own 
past usage of it. It would then become possible for her to correct miscal-
culations, written mistakes, or speech errors made by her at any time in 
the past. That is to say, if the skeptical solution worked effectively, then 
it would imply that “following a rule” has already been distinguished 
from “thinking that one follows a rule” in a solitary setting. 
Conversely, if the distinction did not come into existence within a soli-
tary language, the skeptical solution could not work properly, because if 
it did not, the conception of “following a rule correctly (or incorrectly)” 
cannot come into existence. 
3-3 wittgenstein’s acceptance of KSc
In the absence of LW’s proposing the skeptical solution that resorts to 
the existence of community to negate premise 2, no other options seem 
to exist save negating premise 1 to avoid the self-defeating conclusion of 
KP. In other words, LW’s refusal to accept the skeptical solution is sup-
posed to provide convincing grounds for his denial of premise 1.
For the purpose of providing the entire structure of KW’s argument, I 
formulate KP as I did in section 3-1. Although this formulation might 
prevent clarity in this regard, the crux of KP is, no doubt, premise 1. 
This is because KW believes that we cannot help but accept the skepti-
cal conclusion with respect to meaning expressed by premise 1, whereas 
we can at least avoid the self-defeating conclusion of KP, although in a 
skeptical way. I will refer to premise 1 as “KSC” (Kripke’s skeptical con-
clusion) to avoid confusion with KP.
Although not attributing the skeptical solution to LW provides the 
grounds for believing that LW negates KSC, as I have shown, does LW 
really do this? Negation of KSC amounts to believing that it is possible 
to provide a “straight solution” to KSC. Does LW present a straight so-
lution anywhere? I cannot reply in the affirmative. In my view, not only 
can a straight solution not be found anywhere in PI,12 but also the very 
12  For example, Wright (Wright 2001, Ch.7, 2007) provides a precise and persuasive 
argument for this interpretation of PI.
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assumption that LW proposes such a straightforward solution is incom-
patible with the later views of Wittgenstein. Therefore, Kripke’s inter-
pretation that LW accepts KSC is certainly valid, at least in that respect. 
Let me confirm the grounds for this conclusion.
Two candidates for the straight solution to KSC can be identified: 1) a 
non-intentional, reductive fact (a variety of a dispositional view) and 
2) an intentional, primitive fact.13 Scholars who claim that LW provides 
either of these solutions basically identify the grounds for this claim in 
the fact that LW dissolves WP as a disguised paradox.14 As described in 
section 2, the fact that “we follow a rule blindly” in a normal situation 
based on our natural disposition (non-intentional, reductive fact) is op-
posed against the paradoxical conclusion of WP that “a rule could not 
determine any course of action.” Thus, reductio ad absurdum, the insist-
ence that our grasping a rule is not an interpretation follows. Grasping 
a rule in a way that is not an interpretation seems to indicate the exist-
ence of intentional, primitive facts about a meaning that can be grasped 
only in a peculiar manner.
Here however, the fact that WP differs fundamentally from KP, which 
was pointed out in section 2, must be noted. In fact, KW begins to prove 
KSC under the presupposition that WP can be dissolved as a disguised 
paradox. The “I” who responds to the skeptical challenge is acknowl-
edged as immediately producing the answer “125” to the question “68 + 
57 = ?” based on his natural disposition. Therefore, “a way of grasping a 
rule which is not an interpretation” is exhibited in the answer “125.” Pre-
supposing this, he who is challenged by the semantic skeptic sets out 
to provide a counterexample to a skeptical argument, but his attempts 
ends in failure. 
At this point, I can provide a more definite description of the differ-
ence between WP and KSC. WP represents the paradox that arises in 
advance of applying the rule, namely that one cannot select any one 
of the logically possible alternatives. On the other hand, KSC signifies 
the paradox that you cannot prove afterword and retrospectively that 
the application of the rule applied without hesitation (68 + 57 = 125) 
 accords with your previous intention. To be more exact, you cannot 
prove that only the application that you have performed accords with 
13  Soames (Soames 1998) provides this classification about straight solutions. 
14  I can adduce that Horwich (Horwich, 1998) is one typical example of the former, 
and McDowell (McDowell, ibid) is one typical example of the latter.
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your previous intention and that it is logically impossible that any oth-
er alternative accords with your previous intention. (It is evident that 
KW’s argument begins under settings in which the justification for the 
application that has already been executed is investigated retrospec-
tively.) Therefore, whereas WP can be dissolved only if the conditions 
for blind obedience to a rule are satisfied, the skeptical doubt that leads 
to KSC can be said to begin where WP is dissolved. Thus, I cannot help 
but conclude that attempts to identify the argument that enables us to 
dissolve WP as a disguised paradox with the rationale for negating KSC 
misses the point completely. 
I think a still more convincing rationale for endorsing LW’s acceptance 
of KSC can be identified. For the sake of argument, let us assume that 
LW negates KSC; that is, let us assume that Wittgenstein thinks that a 
fact about meaning exists. Then, for example, the answer “125” that I 
produce at t
1
 (present) to the question “68 + 57 = ?” is justified by the 
fact about meaning, “+,” at t
0
 (past). Of all the possible alternatives, only 
“125” is given the status of truth. However, is it conceivable that the per-
son who reaches such a conclusion goes on to persistently investigate 
the certainty of a calculation (e.g., 12 × 12 = 144) (On Certainty (OC) 
§43, 447, 651, 653-4)? Alternately is it conceivable that the same person 
states “even when the calculation is something fixed for me, this is only 
a decision for a practical purpose” (OC §49) about such a calculation or 
asks, “[w]ould the certainty really be greater for being checked twenty 
times?” (OC §77) (For example, with respect to the latter question, it is 
thought that the problem of whether the degree of certainty of a calcu-
lation depends on how many times recalculation is performed ought 
not be investigated philosophically when the certainty is believed to be 
conferred by a fact about meaning.) That is to say, the assumption that 
LW negates KSC renders the ardent investigation of the certainty of an 
elemental kind of arithmetical equation, which he undertook after PI, 
totally incomprehensible.15
4. An aporia of KP and another skeptical solution
Based on the grounds described above, I cannot help but agree with 
Kripke that LW accepts KSC. However, under these circumstances, a se-
rious aporia about KP presumably arises. LW is not thought to accept 
15  Wright (Wright 2004), who basically agrees with KW, at least in respect to LW’s 
acceptance of KSC, argues that LW’s consideration of certainty presupposes that LW 
admits the revisability or non-infallibility of mathematical propositions. 
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the self-refuting consequence of KP, namely, that every sentence has 
no meaning. To avoid this consequence, one of the two premises must 
be negated. Yet, neither negating premise 2 and attributing the skepti-
cal solution to LW nor negating premise 1 and attributing the straight-
forward solution against KSC to LW can be consistent with LW. It thus 
seems to be impossible to avoid the self-refuting consequence of KP. 
This is an aporia for LW regarding KP.
The interpretation that LW has remained under this aporia without be-
ing aware of the predicament is possible because it is not LW who explic-
itly formulated KP. Therefore, this inconsistency in LW can be revealed 
only when the whole of LW’s arguments is seen from the perspective 
provided by KP. But this is the worst interpretation of the subject. Given 
this, how should we avoid adopting the worst interpretation? 
The aporia of KP stems from the assumption that the negation of prem-
ise 2 implies the adoption of KW’s skeptical solution. However, it is 
possible to negate premise 2 without adopting KW’s skeptical solution. 
Thus, when the bi-conditional, “a semantic statement is true iff a fact 
about meaning exists,” and the assertibility condition, which resorts 
to the existence of community, are denied, what kind of condition is 
 possible? 16 
Let me clarify the conditions under which we will seek a solution of 
the aporia. First, we have to accept premise 1 of KP (= KSC) as valid. 
In short, we admit that no facts about meaning exist. Second, we are 
forced to negate premise 2 to avoid KP. That is to say, we admit that it 
is possible that sematic statements are established as true (or meaning-
ful), even under the condition that there exist no facts about meaning. 
Finally, we reject Kripke’s skeptical solution, the communitarian view, 
as an alternative that can make semantic statements true (meaningful). 
Our task is to search for a way out of the aporia of KP under these three 
conditions. 
Before beginning this task, we must take several detours to elucidate the 
features of semantic statements within Kripke’s argument. Indeed, the 
settings under which Kripke develops his argument give them a peculiar 
16  KW’s expression of a conversion of “a picture based on truth conditions to one 
based on assertibility conditions” is also misleading because it seems to entail aban-
donment of the concept of truth. Although I cannot discuss this subject here, suf-
fice it to say that introducing two different types of concept truth, inflationary and 
deflationary, is supposed to settle the problem. 
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kind of complexity. For example, Kripke uses the following semantic 
statement: “Jones means addition (quaddition) by ‘+.’” 17 According to 
him, because there is no fact that corresponds to the semantic state-
ments and makes them true, they have no sense. Conversely, under the 
supposition that facts about meaning exist, they have sense and can 
turn out to be true or false. What will follow from this supposition? To 
clarify the comparison with the skeptical solution that we will present 
in a following argument, let me confirm this.
Suppose that there existed a fact about the meaning of plus among the 
inner (mental) or outer (physical) facts about Smith at time point t
0
. 
At t
1
, he unhesitatingly calculates “57 + 68 = 125” using the number 57 
for the first time. The result of this calculation could be justified abso-
lutely by the fact about meaning of plus at t
0
. All calculating formulas 
that are incompatible with “57 + 68 = 125” such as “57 + 68 = 5” would be 
completely denied as false. In this way, the equation “57 + 68 = 125” that 
Smith produces would be infallible and absolutely certain.
If the existence of a fact about the meaning of quus was assumed, the 
same type of argument would hold for the equation “57 + 68 = 5” and 
calculating formulas that are incompatible with it. If Smith produced 
“57 + 68 = 125,” it would be denied as totally false by the fact of quus. 
Then, if there were a condition that could render such semantic state-
ments true (or meaningful) under the premise that no fact about mean-
ing exists, what would it be? It is our task here to provide a convincing 
answer to this question. According to my view, there can be no answer 
to it other than the following. It is that a subject believes with some de­
gree of justification 18that a new sentence, which is constructed under 
a new circumstance, is true and that any sentence that the constructor 
believes to be incompatible with it is false. For example, Smith believes 
that “57 + 68 = 125,” a statement he has constructed by using a number 
that is equal to or larger than 57 for the first time, is true and that any 
calculating formula that he believes to be incompatible with it (such as 
“57 + 68 = 5”) is false. The essence of this proposal, a new skeptical so-
lution, consists in its individualism: that it is ultimately any individual’s 
17  cf. Kripke, ibid, 77, etc.
18  By “with justification to some degree,” I mean justification that enables us to 
distinguish a totally blind belief without any reason from a belief resting on some 
reasonable reason that the believer herself is ready to present if required. In the fol-
lowing argument, I will use the term “believe” or “belief” to designate one with this 
tacit condition.
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belief in a sentence that is constructed by using signs that can make se-
mantic statements meaningful (or true). 
Although the proposal seems to offer little at present, I will elaborate 
on its details to provide a certain degree of justification. For the sake of 
clarity, I will formulate this proposal based on the example described 
above. 
[Cp -S0]
“Smith means plus by ‘+’” is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 
125” is true and “68 + 57 = α,” which he believes to be incompatible 
with “68 + 57 = 125,” is false. 
α: any sign except ‘125’
This formulation is obviously insufficient, because it is not only “68+57= 
125” but also other sentences including ‘+’ that Smith has used in the 
past that contribute to the meaning of plus. Therefore, the set of sen-
tences that it is necessary for Smith to believe to be true must comprise 
the formulas of addition that are produced by adding a pair of numbers 
that are lower than 57 and that Smith believes to be true, such as “56 
+ 39 = 95,” as well as the theoretical sentences including natural num-
bers and “+” that Smith believes to be true, such as “x + y = y + x.” I will 
use the abbreviated notation “plus-T(x)” to represent such sentences. 
Moreover, the set of sentences that it is necessary for Smith to believe to 
be false must comprise every sentence that Smith believes to be incom-
patible with each member of plus-T(x), such as “56 + 39 = 5” and “x + y 
≠ y + x.” I will represent all of them with the abbreviated notation “plus-
F(x).” Then, [Cp-S0] can be revised in the following way.
[Cp-S1]
“Smith means plus by ‘+’” is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 
125” is true, “x” is true, “68 + 57 =α,” which he believes to be incom-
patible with “68 + 57 = 125,” is false, and “y” is false.
{x | x ∊ plus-T(x)}
{y | y ∊ plus-F(y)}19
α: any sign except “125”
Then the bi-conditional for “Smith means quus by ‘+”’ can be formulat-
ed in the following manner.
19  Here, “x” and “y” are used as variants that represent sentential compositions.
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[Cq-S1]
“Smith means quus by ‘+’” is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 5” 
is true, “x” is true, “68 + 57 = α,” which he believes to be incompatible 
with “68 + 57 = 5” is false, and “y” is false.
{x | x ∊ quus-T(x)}
{y | y ∊ quus-F(y)20}
α: any sign except “5”
At this point, we admit that there is no fact about meaning. Therefore, 
any calculation that Smith performs using “+” is not infallible. Suppose 
that Smith satisfies [Cp-S1]. However, at some point Smith’s belief in 
“68 + 57 = 125” may be converted to a belief in “68 + 57 = 5.” If he satisfies 
[Cq-S1] along with this belief, then he is supposed to mean not “plus” 
but “quus.” In this way, uncertainty persists in that Smith is not guaran-
teed unrevisability about which function he means by “+.” Because the 
existence of a fact about meaning is negated, it is impossible for us to 
evade such uncertainty.
However, semantic statements can be adequately meaningful even 
under the skeptical constraint. For example, it is actually possible for 
Smith to fulfill [Cp-S1]. Then, “Smith means plus by ‘+’” is attributed 
to him. Because he cannot satisfy [Cq-S1] at the same time, he does not 
mean quus by “+” at this point. The contrary case can be supposed logi-
cally. In that case, the specific semantic statement, “Smith means quus 
by ‘+’” will be attributed to him. What is still more important is that 
when he notices his own mistake, for instance, he finds not “68 + 57 = 
125” but “68 + 57 = 5” to be true, satisfying not [Cp-S1] but [Cq-S1], it be-
comes possible for him to say “I have believed that I mean plus by ‘+,’ but 
now realize it is a mistake. In fact, I have meant quus by ‘+’.” Here, the 
distinction between “to think one is obeying a rule” and “to obey a rule” 
(PI§202) comes into existence although in a relative sense. In this situ-
ation, it seems to Smith that his past self only thought he was follow-
ing a rule (= meaning) for “+.” This is because the past Smith followed a 
feigned rule of “+” without knowing the correct rule (= meaning) of “+,” 
that is, quus. On the other hand, the present Smith can be said to follow 
the rule (= meaning) of “+” (quus) without any such divergence. 
However, there is a bizarre character to the formulations ([Cp-S1] [Cq-S1]). 
If the new skeptical solution proposed here is to be individualistic in a 
20  “quus-T(x)” and “quus-F(y)” are abbreviated notations that represent sets in the 
assumed cases of quus that correspond to sets in the case of plus.
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genuine sense, all the conditions must be formulated from Smith’s per-
spective. When Smith satisfies the conditions of the right side of the bi-
conditional in [Cq-S1], the semantic statement “Smith means quus by 
‘+’” will be attributed to him. Yet, Smith ought not attribute a semantic 
statement such as “I (= Smith) means quus by ‘+’” to himself. Indeed, 
because he believes that the correct answer achieved by following a cor-
rect rule (meaning) for “+” is (not “68 + 57 = 125” but) “68 + 57 = 5,” 
he ought think that he does not mean an anomalistic meaning such as 
quus but instead means a canonical meaning of plus even under this sit-
uation. Therefore, these conditions ([Cp-S1] [Cq-S1]) are thought to be 
formulated from a perspective of third person other than Smith. 
If this view is valid, the skeptical solution proposed here is nothing but 
a communitarian variant, which is contrary to my initial intention be-
cause whether the meaning intended by any subject by any sign is ca-
nonical or anomalistic depends on the view of a third person (commu-
nity) in these formulations. They are reformulated by Smith’s viewpoint 
to avoid this difficulty. 
[CS]
“Smith means plus by ‘+’” is true iff Smith believes that “x” is true 
and “y” is false.
{x | x ∊ P-T(x)} 
{y | y ∊ P-F(y)}
Here, any member of the set that is composed of both of equations of 
addition and sentences of the theory of natural numbers (“x + y = y + 
x”), which Smith believes to be true at present, is supposed to be sub-
stituted for “x.” (This extended version of plus-T(x) will be named “P-
T(x)”). Any member of the set that is composed of sentences that Smith 
believes are incompatible with each member of the set P-T(x) and are 
false is substituted for “y.” (This extended version of plus-F(x) will be 
called “P-F(x)”). Generalizing [CS] in terms of subject, sign, and mean-
ing, we can gain 
[C*]
For any s (subject), M (meaning): “s means M by ‘M’” is true iff s be-
lieves that “x” is true and “y” is false.
{x | x ∊ M-T(x)}
{y | y ∊ M-F(y)}
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Any member of a set composed of beliefs that are specified by a given 
subject (including Smith), a given meaning (including plus), and a giv-
en sign (including “+”) (M-T(x), M-F(y)) is substituted for “x” and “y” in 
[C*]. The remarkable feature of [C*] is that the disquotational relation 
between sign and meaning holds in the semantic statement (“s means 
M by ‘M’” ) in [C*]. Anomalistic kinds of semantic statements such as 
“Smith means quus by ‘+’” can be ruled out by this stipulation. Therefore, 
it can be said that a third-person perspective, one other than that of the 
subject(s) represented in [C*], does not tacitly creep into the formulation.
This individualistic condition for semantic statements restores the soli-
tary language, which is fundamentally distinguished from the private 
language, which Kripke’s skeptical solution unjustifiably exiles from the 
domain of language to a reasonable status as a legitimate language. It is 
not the agreement with others or the community, but each individual’s 
usage of signs and beliefs that enables semantic statements to become 
true (or meaningful). According to my view, insofar as the meanings 
that each subject understands generally coincide, a theoretically fatal 
defect, such as that pointed out about Kripke’s skeptical solution, is not 
produced by this solution. 
 However, as this argument admits that no fact about meaning exists, 
it is possible that a crucial and fundamental disagreement, such as that 
between plus and quus, will arise. It is logically possible that complete 
anarchy arises when the meaning attributed to a sign, such as ‘E’, differs 
for all individuals. In such an anarchic situation, which meaning is or is 
judged to be true?
My reply to this question is very clear. It is this I who determines which 
meaning is correct or true in such anarchy. Indeed, if it were essentially 
different from mine, I could not help but comprehend the meaning that 
the other person accords a given sign as an anomalistic and deviant one. 
However, which I is meant by “this I” in the previous paragraph? At this 
phase, the individualism of the skeptical solution advocated in this pa-
per is forced to confront the problem of solipsism, which haunted Witt-
genstein for the whole of his life. Yet, I think that solipsism does not 
pose a theoretical difficulty, at least against this new skeptical solution. 
In short, solipsism can, at most, make the solution unable to identify 
the condition for semantic statements in a general form. However, as 
this issue requires an exceedingly cautious and exact approach, I must 
address it in another paper. 
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 At any rate, it seems to me that there can be no alternative but the new 
skeptical solution proposed above if the aporia of KP is to be avoided. 
Although the proposal obviously requires considerable modification 
and elaboration, I think that this paper elucidates one way to evade the 
aporia and provide a certain degree of grounding for it. 
By himself, LW does not formulate KP differently from WP. Therefore, 
it is not the case that LW explicitly advocates this kind of skeptical solu-
tion. However, it seems to be the only interpretation that is consistent 
with LW and that enables him to avoid the aporia of KP.
primljeno: 15. mart 2014.
prihvaćeno: 10. april 2014.
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Ken Šigeta
Obrazloženje problema dve forme semantičkog skepticizma:  
Vitgenštajnov paradoks sleđenja pravila i Kripkeov semantički paradoks
apstrakt
Bez obzira na uporne pokušaje odbrane Kripkeovog argumenta (Kripke 
1982), čini se da su analize ovog argumenta došle do konsenzusa oko toga 
da se on odlikuje kobnim nedostacima kako u interpretaciji Vitgenštajna, 
tako i u argumentaciji povodom značenja kao nezavisnog od interpretacije. 
Većina filozofa koji se ne slažu sa Kripkeovim gledištem direktno su upore-
đivali razlike njegovog razumevanja Vitgenštajna (KW) sa samom Vitgen-
štajnovom perpsektivom (LW) u Filozofskim istraživanjima (PI) i nakon 
njih. Ipak, smatram da su oni koji su pažljivo i bez predubeđenja čitali kako 
PI, tako i Kripkeovu knjigu Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 
stekli utisak drugačiji od onog koji je opšteprihvaćen: da KW nije direktno 
suprotstavljen LW. I zaista, čini se da KW predstavlja jedan aspekt LW na 
izoštren način, mada neizbežno ostaje utisak da KW u izvesnom pogledu 
odstupa od LW.
U ovom članku pokušaću da razjasnim osnove ovog utiska tako što ću for-
mulisati paradokse koje su izložili Vitgenštajn i Kripke i ukazati na složenu 
relaciju između ova dva oblika semantičkih paradoksa. Zatim ću predložiti 
ne samo novu interpretaciju argumenta o značenju koji se nalazi u PI, nego 
i shemu ili uslove za semantiku koja, kako smatram, jeste samosvojna, ne-
zavisna od predmeta egzegeze.
Ključne reči: Semantika, skepticizam, problem sleđenja pravila, kasniji 
Vitgenštajn, Kripke.
